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Missing the Target

Over the past several years, target-date (or life-cycle) mutual funds have gained popularity as fund companies tout them as an easy way for investors to obtain an appropriate asset mix in their portfolio for a particular age or investment timeframe. 

Theoretically, these funds are designed to allow an investor to select a date that approximately corresponds to their retirement – say 2020 or 2030, and the fund manager will attempt to provide an allocation of stocks, bonds, and cash that becomes more conservative the closer the individual gets to retirement. 

The idea is that the investor can rest comfortably knowing that their investments are properly aligned with their risk tolerance and time horizon. 

However, as an article in Fortune magazine recently pointed out, investors hoping that target-date funds would be a simple way to ensure they were properly managing risk have been shocked by the overly-aggressive nature of these funds.

The article points out that, “According to Israelsen, the average 2010 fund marketed to investors who were aiming to retire next year – was more than 45% invested in stocks in December.  As of March 2008, the mammoth Fidelity Freedom 2010 Fund (FFFCX) housed 50% of its assets in equities, and AllianceBernstein’s 2010 portfolio (LTDAX) was 57% in stocks in February of last year.  The funds lost 25% and 33%, respectively, last year, barely beating the S&P 500.” 

Investors hoping to retire next year surely were not expecting a portfolio allocation that could expose them to 25% or 33% losses.

Industry professionals attribute the miserable performance of these funds to poor execution by fund managers, who in an attempt to chase extra returns that could help market the funds, added unnecessary risk to their portfolios by overexposing to equities.  The performance has been so alarmingly bad that Wisconsin Senator Herb Kohl has asked the SEC and Department of Labor to investigate target-date funds, particularly since many employers offer these funds in 401(k) plans and brokerages aggressively market these funds to investors for individual retirement accounts.

The bottom line is that investors should be wary when considering these funds for their retirement accounts.  In addition to the performance and asset allocation issues described above, expense ratios on these funds can be heavy and funds can include loads or commissions.  Furthermore, the asset mix in these funds is generally limited to stocks and bonds, excluding other important asset classes such as commodities and real estate that can help balance out a portfolio.

SmartMoney: ETFs “pushing mutual funds out of the picture”

There is a great article posted today at smartmoney.com about the gains ETFs are making against mutual funds.  The article describes the rapid growth of ETFs, the fact that some fund companies such as Vanguard are issuing their own ETFs in order to survive, and the benefits to an investor of owning ETFs instead of mutual funds – especially for the bond portion of a portfolio.

The article says there might be a place for actively managed funds in a portfolio (though most people know by now that most actively managed funds underperform their benchmarks over time) but it concludes that “trying to make a case for a mutual fund can be difficult.”

Mutual Fund Company Magic

When a broker tries to sell you a mutual fund, or your advisor touts the performance of a fund he or she wants to put your money into, it is modus operandi to show how wonderful the fund has performed against its benchmark, or relative to its peers.  

Before you jump into the fund, consider the impact of survivorship bias on those published performance numbers.  As the PSY-FI blog explains, survivorship bias is the result of the all-too-often habit of mutual fund companies to merge the assets of underperforming funds into the successful ones. 

Your fund might have a terrible year – perhaps miss its benchmark by 50% or more – but if you blink you just might miss that your fund was closed and your assets have moved into a succesful fund with a great track record….voila, in an instant your fund is gone and your investment is in a fund that has the best 10 year track record of any fund in its category!!!  Your bad investment has magically disappeared. Congratulations!

PSY-FI explains a number of other creative ways fund companies improve perceived returns, including ‘easy history’ bias or ‘easy data’ bias, but the main lesson for investors is simply caveat emptor!

Mutual Funds Walking, Not Running, Toward ETFs

Yes, with great anticipation and fanfare both Pimco and Schwab have proclaimed their intention to enter the ETF space. And both will likely bring with them actively managed strategies. But, given the staggering capital flows out of traditional, actively managed mutual funds and correspondingly massive flows to index-based ETFs, where’s the stampede of active mutual fund managers to the ETF structure?

We can still count on one hand the number of actively managed ETFs, comprising all of $21.5 million in assets and 0.0048% of total market ETF assets (4/14, consisting of five Powershares active ETFs of which two are formulaic and represent one-half of the assets; total ETF market assets as of Feb 09, source ICI). Hardly a relevant feature on the ETF landscape at present.

Why the slow rollout pace for actively managed ETFs? One need look no further than the “what’s in it for me?” question.

What changes for the active manager that “goes ETF”?

The most important operational change is that fund holdings must be reported daily, rather than quarterly, sixty days in arrears. In the active manager’s “what’s in it for me?” ledger this is a definitive negative. While the ETF format doesn’t hang the active manager’s strategy in public view, it does – on a daily basis – display the fund’s holdings. Daily reporting of ETF holdings also removes any opportunity to hide aggressive active manager behavior that might otherwise forever remain out of public view in a traditional mutual fund format. The long reporting cycle for the traditional mutual fund enables position “clean-up” activities or “window dressing” to the detriment of shareholders.

What changes for the investor drinking the active-manager kool-aid via an ETF wrapper?

Holdings transparency – going from holdings data that is three-to-five months stale to daily visibility. This is important for any risk manager – enabling a “trust but verify” doctrine.

Improved tax efficiency – ETF creation / redemption activity is generally classified as non-taxable, in-kind exchanges – generally significantly stripping funds of the internally-generated capital gains commonly experienced in traditional mutual funds.

What doesn’t necessarily change: An active mutual fund manager doesn’t necessarily shed a cent of overhead when adopting an ETF structure. And it’s not in any active manager’s m.o. to surrender fees simply to compete with passively-managed index-based ETFs – charging, on average, one-fifth as much as actively managed mutual funds (average for US equity ETFs, Morgan Stanley, “ETF Overview and Strategies”, 11/19/08, p16).

What else doesn’t change: Active managers consistently under-perform their self-selected index benchmarks. Active managers outperforming their index benchmark in any given year reside squarely in the minority, with those managing the feat two or three years running fewer yet.  And when both fees and the element of luck are stripped away, less than one percent of active mutual fund managers outperform their index benchmark in any given year. Taking fees to zero, improves the active manager’s chances of outperforming the fund’s index benchmark to nearly ten percent when the element of statistically random luck is removed (Wermers, et al, “False Discoveries in Mutual Fund Performance: Measuring Luck in Estimated Alphas”, 5/08; also in related NY Times article, “The Prescient are Few”, Mark Hulbert, 7/13/08)

While index-based ETFs have achieved critical mass and clearly have gone mainstream, actively-managed ETFs have not yet “arrived” and, at least in the near term, active managers will continue to struggle with the “what’s in it for me” question as indexed-based ETFs continue their forward march.

Introducing….Housing ETFs

The much anticipated and long-awaited MacroShares ETFs tracking the S&P Case Shiller Composite-10 Home Price Index will make their debut on April 28th.  The bullish MacroShares Major Metro Housing Up (UMM) ETF will seek to deliver three times the cumulative percentage change in the benchmark index while the bearish MacroShares Major Metro Housing Down (DMM) will attempt deliver three times the inverse cumulative percentage change in the index.

This particular Case Shiller Index is a value-weighted index of 10 major U.S. metropolitan areas, representing approximately 30% of the U.S. total housing market, with weights derived from U.S. Census data on housing counts and average home prices.  While not the case recently, housing returns have historically shown low or negative correlations when compared to other asset classes.  By providing exposure to housing, these ETFs will allow investors to more purely access the real estate market (outside of actually buying a house) – something they currently cannot do.  The $20 trillion U.S. housing market has never been securitized in this fashion, thus these ETFs will open-up a whole new realm to investors.

Similar to other MacroShares products, these ETFs are uniquely structured in that they are only offered in pairs, with an equal number of UMM and DMM shares created (with the combined price of the shares not exceeding $50).  Both ETFs have separate trusts fully collateralized by short-term U.S. Treasuries with an underlying settlement agreement between the trusts that pledge assets to each other based on the movement of the underlying Case Shiller Index.  For example, if UMM and DMM both start with a value of $25 per share and the underlying index moves up 4%, $3 is “shifted” from the DMM trust to the UMM trust ($25 x 4% = $1, $1 x 3 leverage = $3), thus the price of UMM goes to $28 and DMM to $22 (though note that the assets won’t actually move between the trusts until the final settlement date as described below).

In addition to the gain or loss on the movement of the shares, there is the potential for additional income if the interest on the Treasuries held in the trusts exceed the trusts’ expenses.  Also, because of the unique structure and leverage of these ETFs, there are some other nuances to be aware of.  If one of the funds goes up or down significantly, there is the potential that they effectively drain the assets of the other fund (in our example if the index moves up or down by more than 33.3%).  In this case, the funds would simply be liquidated and investors paid at the net asset value.  Regardless of performance, the funds have a final scheduled termination date of November 25th, 2014, whereby they will be liquidated and the net asset value paid out.

There are several ways in which investors may be able to take advantage of these products:  1) If they have a strong conviction regarding the future direction of the housing market and want to attempt to capitalize on that conviction; 2) a homeowner could theoretically use DMM as a hedge on their own house (i.e. if the value of housing is decreasing, DMM would be increasing; 3) a future homeowner might be able to protect their ability to afford a house in an increasing market five years from now by purchasing UMM today; or 4) an investor may simply want some exposure to an uncorrelated asset as part of their overall portfolio.  Note that the expense ratio on UMM and DMM is 1.25%.

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